[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: Hardened toolchain
From: |
Katherine Cox-Buday |
Subject: |
Re: Hardened toolchain |
Date: |
Tue, 26 Apr 2022 06:07:10 -0500 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.2 (gnu/linux) |
raingloom <raingloom@riseup.net> writes:
> People shouldn't have to take extra steps and burn extra CPU cycles
> for security.
To be clear, I don't have a strong opinion on this, but I wanted to give an
alternative viewpoint: people shouldn't have to take extra steps and burn extra
CPU cycles for performance.
Everyone has different threat models and needs. A lot of computers have CPU
speculative execution attack mitigation disabled because those types of attacks
will never affect those computers, and it reduces the performance of the CPU a
lot.
I suggest we pick our default with care, and if possible with data about what
most users would like.
--
Katherine
- Re: Hardened toolchain, kiasoc5, 2022/04/14
- Message not available
- Message not available
- Message not available
- Message not available
- Re: Hardened toolchain, jbranso, 2022/04/15
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Zhu Zihao, 2022/04/15
- Re: Hardened toolchain, raingloom, 2022/04/15
- Re: Hardened toolchain,
Katherine Cox-Buday <=
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Aurora, 2022/04/28
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Katherine Cox-Buday, 2022/04/28
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Aurora, 2022/04/28
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Vagrant Cascadian, 2022/04/28
- Re: Hardened toolchain, Aurora, 2022/04/28