Re: [Duplicity-talk] Manifest stores SHA1 hash of files, checked before restore?

[edgar . soldin]

On 13.07.2011 17:53, Chris Poole wrote:
> Neither Duplicity nor Alice would realise that the file had been
> altered when she restored it. (Thus, it's very important to sign
> backups being stored in untrusted locations.)
> 
> 
> Or am I missing something?

It is provided the public key used is published somewhere or in other ways 
available to a possible attacker. If you create a keypair just for your backup 
and keep it on the backup machine and in your secure storage (for restoring) 
you don't necessarily need it.

On the other hand. Currently duplicity needs a private key to work reliably, so 
signing to it does no harm and can be seen as an extra lock for an intruder to 
pick. see http://bugs.launchpad.net/duplicity/+bug/687295

ede/duply.net