Re: Backdoor in xz, should we switch compression format for tarballs?

[Alex Bennée]

Also does qemu link to libarchive? The original analysis wasn't a full reverse engineer of the payload so we don't know if it only affects sshd.

On Sat, 30 Mar 2024, 07:01 Daniel P. Berrangé, <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:

On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 06:59:30PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> For more info, see
> https://lwn.net/ml/oss-security/20240329155126.kjjfduxw2yrlxgzm@awork3.anarazel.de/
> but, essentially, xz was backdoored and it seems like upstream was directly
> responsible for this.
>
> Based on this, should we switch our distribution from bz2+xz to bz2+zstd or
> bz2+lzip?

Based on the attack vector of pre-loading git with an exploit, but then
modifying the tarball to activate it, there's a bigger question of whether
users should really trust manually created tarballs at all ? You don't
anything about either the tarball creator, or the state of creators' machine,
even if it is signed. How can you trust that its contents is a faithful
representation of the tagged release from git it claims to be?

This issue could prompt a push towards distros only handling tarballs
directly auto-generated from a git tag, in a reliably reproducible manner.

Obviously you couldn't actually trust the upstream maintainer in this
case, but at least if you're using a reproducible git tarball you can
verify every link in the chain right through each git commit, and don't
have this manual tarball whose contents need to be to picked apart.

TL;DR; I think we should consider our tarball distribution options, but
lets wait for the dust to settle and not rush into decisions.

With regards,
Daniel
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