Re: About 'qemu-security' mailing list

[P J P]

+-- On Thu, 1 Oct 2020, Darren Kenny wrote --+
| The storage of reproducers would indeed be good to have in something
| like Gitlab - but that'd require someone to extract it and store it, but
| under what naming would be another issue... But really that's behind the
| scenes.

  Yes.
 
| > Maybe we could start with a moderated list and improvise as we go forward?
| 
| I really think that encryption of the details of a vulnerability is 
| important, if somehow it gets intercepted - which is not that difficult with 
| e-mail - then there is the potential for a malicious party to exploit it 
| before a fix is available to distros, and deployed.

  Encrypted list, open to receive non-encrypted reports seems okay. Will have 
to check how to set it up and its workflow.
 
| Something that has happened since the Intel Spectre/Meltdown vulnerabilities 
| were initially brought to light is more communication between security teams 
| in various orgs. To do this those discussions have started being done on 
| Keybase, which provides secure chats as well as secured Git repos.
| 
| Has anything like that being considered as the point for subsequent 
| discussions on issues post the initial disclosure?

  That has not come up for QEMU issues yet. Maybe we could consider it in 
future if required.

+-- On Thu, 1 Oct 2020, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote --+
| The problem with Keybase was how to review patches. Now if they had a 
| encrypted mailing list as part of their Git repos that would be awesome. 
| (Trying to find a "Feature request" but not having much luck :-()

 True. Email + PGP/GPG has been around for so many years, yet there is no 
seamless combination of the two. :(

Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
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