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Re: SHA-1 MBR


From: phcoder
Subject: Re: SHA-1 MBR
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 00:41:45 +0100
User-agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.19 (X11/20090105)

Hello
Jan Alsenz wrote:
Hi!

Wow, cool work!
Thanks
It's not complete SHA-1, but the rest should be just a constant offset.
I already said how it differs from standard one. If you feed padded byteswapped data to it and then byteswap the rsult back you obtain exactly normal SHA-1. But as I said if size is fixed it's compeletely equivalent in security to normal SHA-1 (you can easily prove formally that any successful attack on one variant immediately results in successful attack on another variant)

But I'm still not sure, what you are trying to do here, is the MBR your root of
trust?

I'm trying to achieve universal verification scheme which is able to do what is needed to support tpm ("prolonging chain of trust" in tpm unstandard parlance) without using tpm itself. Such scheme can in future be useful in other applications as well.
> If not, who checks the MBR?
This can't be done by grub because it happens before any part of grub is loaded. to verify grub you need to rely on vendor/platform-specific mechanisms. I personally find "tpm without tpm" more attractive because it can be easily reused on another platform or any alternative to tpm (perhaps anybody here or coreboot folks will come up with something). Additionally it workarounds many bios and tpm bugs. I will continue working on sha-1 boot. My goal is to load core.img checked. After that point there is much more space and any signature based solution can be used.

Greets,

Jan

Regards
Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko





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