Re: [RFC] Boot parameters and geometrical stability

[Robert Millan]

On Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 11:40:32PM +0200, phcoder wrote:
> Robert Millan wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 03, 2008 at 08:49:14PM +0300, Vesa Jääskeläinen wrote:
> >> Possibilites are there, but basically they are limited to something like:
> >>
> >> (ata0) (pci-X-Y-Z:ata0) (usb-X-Y:scsi0) (pci-X-Y-Z:scsi0)
> > 
> > I think this is overkill, and doesn't really address the root of the 
> > problem.
> > 
> > The real security problem here is whether the executable code you're 
> > loading is
> > trusted, NOT where you load the code from.
> If the code is loaded from the same place as we do then we can trust it
> (if attacker could modify the code, he could also modify us)

Right.  I was assuming you mean when code is loaded from different places.
Having untrusted code perform the verification of other untrusted code is
useless, of course.

-- 
Robert Millan

  The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and
  how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we
  still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."