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From: | Tom at FlowCrypt |
Subject: | Re: [Sks-devel] heads-up: another attack tool, using SKS as FS |
Date: | Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:01:31 +0000 |
Hi Ryan,
that would probably be an incomplete mitigation:
-people can use the photo id field instead
-people can use valid e-mail addresses under an own domain ("catch-all")
-your keyserver suddenly can be abused for email spamming
Best regards
Tobias Frei
Am 14.07.2018 um 02:57 schrieb Ryan Hunt:
Could this be mitigated by validating email addresses as they come in? Like sending an encrypted mail to the said address with a return token, If the token is not provided the key is never put into the SKS rotation?
I think a solution like this would be much more effective, and if there was some desire to conform to GDPR at some point it would be pretty much required first step because I cannot see how we could possibly remove keys without a command signed by that key, and putting this in place would make that ‘no more difficult to remove than it was to add’..
Regards,
-Ryan Hunt
On Jul 13, 2018, at 11:20 AM, Phil Pennock <address@hidden> wrote:
Signed PGP part
Heads-up:
https://medium.com/@mdrahony/are-pgp-key-servers-breaking-th e-law-under-the-gdpr-a81ddd709 d3e
https://github.com/yakamok/keyserver-fs
https://lobste.rs/s/sle0o4/are_pgp_key_servers_breaking_law_ under
This `keyserver-fs` is software to attack SKS, using it as a filesystem, in
what appears to be a deliberate attack on the viability of continuing to
run a keyserver.
The author is upset that there's no deletion, so is pissing in the pool.
-Phil
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