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From: | Daniel Kahn Gillmor |
Subject: | Re: [Sks-devel] reverse proxies and the pool |
Date: | Mon, 28 Oct 2013 15:38:11 -0400 |
User-agent: | Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/24.0 |
On 10/28/2013 03:25 PM, Gabor Kiss wrote:
1 vote against it. (Sorry if I seem to be ungrateful. :)
can you explain more why?
Ideally, if network traffic should increase, it could be interesting to setup a new subpool (to replace the current HA - High Availability pool) that only include load-balanced setups with multiple SKS servers behind a single reverse proxy. What are your thoughts about such a move?I already explicated that the main vulnerability of key servers is not a temporary network overload at socket level. Guys at No Such Agency once decide to flood the servers with one hundred million fake keys with ardent help of several governments of Near, Middle and Far East.
I share your concerns (though maybe without such geographic specificity), but i'm not sure how they're relevant to the question being asked.
Is an argument against restricting pool.sks-keyservers.net to reverse-proxied servers? or as an argument against creating a new high-availability subpool of servers that actually run their own internally load-balanced setups?
I'm not sure how this argument works in either context. What specific threat is mitigated by leaving servers that are trivially-DoSable in the default pool?
--dkg
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