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[Qemu-stable] [PATCH 31/97] slirp: Add sanity check for str option lengt
From: |
Michael Roth |
Subject: |
[Qemu-stable] [PATCH 31/97] slirp: Add sanity check for str option length |
Date: |
Mon, 1 Apr 2019 15:59:05 -0500 |
From: Fam Zheng <address@hidden>
When user provides a long domainname or hostname that doesn't fit in the
DHCP packet, we mustn't overflow the response packet buffer. Instead,
report errors, following the g_warning() in the slirp->vdnssearch
branch.
Also check the strlen against 256 when initializing slirp, which limit
is also from the protocol where one byte represents the string length.
This gives an early error before the warning which is harder to notice
or diagnose.
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <address@hidden>
Cc: address@hidden
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <address@hidden>
Tested-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <address@hidden>
(cherry picked from commit 6e157a0339793bb081705f52318fc77afd10addf)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <address@hidden>
---
net/slirp.c | 9 +++++++++
slirp/bootp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/slirp.c b/net/slirp.c
index 1e14318b4d..fd21dc728c 100644
--- a/net/slirp.c
+++ b/net/slirp.c
@@ -365,6 +365,15 @@ static int net_slirp_init(NetClientState *peer, const char
*model,
return -1;
}
+ if (vdomainname && strlen(vdomainname) > 255) {
+ error_setg(errp, "'domainname' parameter cannot exceed 255 bytes");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (vhostname && strlen(vhostname) > 255) {
+ error_setg(errp, "'vhostname' parameter cannot exceed 255 bytes");
+ return -1;
+ }
nc = qemu_new_net_client(&net_slirp_info, peer, model, name);
diff --git a/slirp/bootp.c b/slirp/bootp.c
index 9e7b53ba94..1e8185f0ec 100644
--- a/slirp/bootp.c
+++ b/slirp/bootp.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t
*bp)
struct in_addr preq_addr;
int dhcp_msg_type, val;
uint8_t *q;
+ uint8_t *end;
uint8_t client_ethaddr[ETH_ALEN];
/* extract exact DHCP msg type */
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t
*bp)
rbp->bp_siaddr = saddr.sin_addr; /* Server IP address */
q = rbp->bp_vend;
+ end = (uint8_t *)&rbp[1];
memcpy(q, rfc1533_cookie, 4);
q += 4;
@@ -292,24 +294,33 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct
bootp_t *bp)
if (*slirp->client_hostname) {
val = strlen(slirp->client_hostname);
- *q++ = RFC1533_HOSTNAME;
- *q++ = val;
- memcpy(q, slirp->client_hostname, val);
- q += val;
+ if (q + val + 2 >= end) {
+ g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
+ "omitting host name option.");
+ } else {
+ *q++ = RFC1533_HOSTNAME;
+ *q++ = val;
+ memcpy(q, slirp->client_hostname, val);
+ q += val;
+ }
}
if (slirp->vdomainname) {
val = strlen(slirp->vdomainname);
- *q++ = RFC1533_DOMAINNAME;
- *q++ = val;
- memcpy(q, slirp->vdomainname, val);
- q += val;
+ if (q + val + 2 >= end) {
+ g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
+ "omitting domain name option.");
+ } else {
+ *q++ = RFC1533_DOMAINNAME;
+ *q++ = val;
+ memcpy(q, slirp->vdomainname, val);
+ q += val;
+ }
}
if (slirp->vdnssearch) {
- size_t spaceleft = sizeof(rbp->bp_vend) - (q - rbp->bp_vend);
val = slirp->vdnssearch_len;
- if (val + 1 > spaceleft) {
+ if (q + val >= end) {
g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
"omitting domain-search option.");
} else {
@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t
*bp)
memcpy(q, nak_msg, sizeof(nak_msg) - 1);
q += sizeof(nak_msg) - 1;
}
+ assert(q < end);
*q = RFC1533_END;
daddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0xffffffffu;
--
2.17.1
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 65/97] fmops: fix off-by-one in AR_TABLE and DR_TABLE array size, (continued)
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 65/97] fmops: fix off-by-one in AR_TABLE and DR_TABLE array size, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 54/97] intel_iommu: introduce vtd_reset_caches(), Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 01/97] target/arm: Fix sign of sve_cmpeq_ppzw/sve_cmpne_ppzw, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 52/97] target/arm: Correct condition for v8M callee stack push, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 28/97] virtio: update MemoryRegionCaches when guest negotiates features, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 61/97] net: drop too large packet early, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 78/97] hw/s390x: Fix bad mask in time2tod(), Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 48/97] net: ignore packet size greater than INT_MAX, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 89/97] hw/rdma: another clang compilation fix, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 91/97] tpm_tis: fix loop that cancels any seizure by a lower locality, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 31/97] slirp: Add sanity check for str option length,
Michael Roth <=
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 53/97] nbd/server: fix NBD_CMD_CACHE, Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 74/97] iotests: make 235 work on s390 (and others), Michael Roth, 2019/04/01
- Re: [Qemu-stable] [PATCH 00/97] Patch Round-up for stable 3.0.1, freeze on 2019-04-08, Cole Robinson, 2019/04/02
- Re: [Qemu-stable] [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 00/97] Patch Round-up for stable 3.0.1, freeze on 2019-04-08, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/04/04