Re: [Qemu-stable] [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 18/30] virtio: validate num_sg when mapping

[Amit Shah]

On (Mon) 31 Mar 2014 [17:17:05], Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> CVE-2013-4535
> CVE-2013-4536
> 
> Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
> VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
> virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
> writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
> 
> To fix, validate num_sg.
> 
> Reported-by: Michael Roth <address@hidden>
> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
> ---
>  hw/virtio/virtio.c | 6 ++++++
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> index bcbfbb2..003b6ad 100644
> --- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> @@ -430,6 +430,12 @@ void virtqueue_map_sg(struct iovec *sg, hwaddr *addr,
>      unsigned int i;
>      hwaddr len;
>  
> +    if (num_sg >= VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE) {
> +        error_report("virtio: map attempt out of bounds: %d > %d",
> +                     num_sg, VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE);
> +        exit(1);

Doesn't compile; needs to be %zd because num_sg is size_t

                Amit