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Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encr
From: |
Greg Kurz |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property |
Date: |
Tue, 12 Jan 2021 11:59:59 +0100 |
On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:00 +1100
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
> get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
> hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
> not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
>
> In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
> almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
>
> So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
> this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
> keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
> the new property.
>
Do we really want to keep "memory-encryption" in the long term ? If
not, then maybe engage the deprecation process and add a warning in
machine_set_memory_encryption() ?
Apart from that, LGTM:
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> ---
> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 5 +++--
> accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 +++--
> hw/core/machine.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> include/hw/boards.h | 2 +-
> include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +-
> target/i386/sev.c | 32 ++------------------------------
> 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 260ed73ffe..28ab126f70 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -2181,8 +2181,9 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
> * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
> * encryption context.
> */
> - if (ms->memory_encryption) {
> - ret = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
> + if (ms->cgs) {
> + /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */
> + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs);
> if (ret < 0) {
> goto err;
> }
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
> index 5db9ab8f00..3d4787ae4a 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
> @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
> #include "qemu-common.h"
> #include "sysemu/sev.h"
>
> -int sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
> {
> - return -1;
> + /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */
> + g_assert_not_reached();
> }
> diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> index 8909117d80..94194ab82d 100644
> --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> #include "migration/global_state.h"
> #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
>
> GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_2[] = {};
> const size_t hw_compat_5_2_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_2);
> @@ -427,16 +428,37 @@ static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object *obj,
> Error **errp)
> {
> MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
>
> - return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption);
> + if (ms->cgs) {
> + return
> g_strdup(object_get_canonical_path_component(OBJECT(ms->cgs)));
> + }
> +
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
> Error **errp)
> {
> - MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
> + Object *cgs =
> + object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), value);
> +
> + if (!cgs) {
> + error_setg(errp, "No such memory encryption object '%s'", value);
> + return;
> + }
>
> - g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
> - ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
> + object_property_set_link(obj, "confidential-guest-support", cgs, errp);
> +}
> +
> +static void machine_check_confidential_guest_support(const Object *obj,
> + const char *name,
> + Object *new_target,
> + Error **errp)
> +{
> + /*
> + * So far the only constraint is that the target has the
> + * TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT interface, and that's checked
> + * by the QOM core
> + */
> }
>
> static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> @@ -836,6 +858,15 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void
> *data)
> object_class_property_set_description(oc, "suppress-vmdesc",
> "Set on to disable self-describing migration");
>
> + object_class_property_add_link(oc, "confidential-guest-support",
> + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
> + offsetof(MachineState, cgs),
> + machine_check_confidential_guest_support,
> + OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG);
> + object_class_property_set_description(oc, "confidential-guest-support",
> + "Set confidential guest scheme to
> support");
> +
> + /* For compatibility */
> object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption",
> machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption);
> object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption",
> @@ -1158,9 +1189,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> cc->deprecation_note);
> }
>
> - if (machine->memory_encryption) {
> + if (machine->cgs) {
> /*
> - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real
> + * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real
> * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
> * areas.
> */
> diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h
> index 17b1f3f0b9..1acd662fa5 100644
> --- a/include/hw/boards.h
> +++ b/include/hw/boards.h
> @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ struct MachineState {
> bool iommu;
> bool suppress_vmdesc;
> bool enable_graphics;
> - char *memory_encryption;
> + ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs;
> char *ram_memdev_id;
> /*
> * convenience alias to ram_memdev_id backend memory region
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> index 7335e59867..3b5b1aacf1 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
>
> #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
>
> -int sev_guest_init(const char *id);
> +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs);
> int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
> int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
> uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index 2a4b2187d6..5399a136ad 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = {
> }
> };
>
> -static SevGuestState *
> -lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id)
> -{
> - Object *obj;
> - SevGuestState *info;
> -
> - obj = object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), id);
> - if (!obj) {
> - return NULL;
> - }
> -
> - info = (SevGuestState *)
> - object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
> - if (!info) {
> - return NULL;
> - }
> -
> - return info;
> -}
> -
> bool
> sev_enabled(void)
> {
> @@ -682,10 +662,9 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState
> state)
> }
> }
>
> -int
> -sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
> {
> - SevGuestState *sev;
> + SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
> char *devname;
> int ret, fw_error;
> uint32_t ebx;
> @@ -698,13 +677,6 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> return -1;
> }
>
> - sev = lookup_sev_guest_info(id);
> - if (!sev) {
> - error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object",
> - __func__, id, TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
> - goto err;
> - }
> -
> sev_guest = sev;
> sev->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
>
- Re: [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option, (continued)
Re: [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option, Daniel P . Berrangé, 2021/01/12
[PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
- Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property,
Greg Kurz <=
[PATCH v6 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init(), David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration, David Gibson, 2021/01/11
[PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support, David Gibson, 2021/01/11