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Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default propertie


From: David Gibson
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:02:17 +1000

On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 07:46:10AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 11:12:45AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 12:06:02PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms 
> > > normal
> > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's 
> > > PEF.
> > > 
> > > So, if a host trust limitation mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > ---
> > >  hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > index a71792bc16..8dfc1bb3f8 100644
> > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > >  #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > >  #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > >  #include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
> > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > >  
> > >  GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {
> > >      { "virtio-balloon-device", "page-poison", "false" },
> > > @@ -1165,6 +1167,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > >           * areas.
> > >           */
> > >          machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > +
> > > +        /*
> > > +         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > +         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > +         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > +         * for virtio pci devices
> > > +         */
> > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", 
> > > "on");
> > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", 
> > > "on");
> > >      }
> > 
> > Silently changing the user's request configuration like this is a bad idea.
> > The "disable-legacy" option in particular is undesirable as that switches
> > the device to virtio-1.0 only mode, which exposes a different PCI ID to
> > the guest.
> > 
> > If some options are incompatible with encryption, then we should raise a
> > fatal error at startup, so applications/admins are aware that their 
> > requested
> > config is broken.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Daniel
> 
> Agreed - my suggestion is an on/off/auto property, auto value
> changes automatically, on/off is validated.

So, I think you're specifically suggesting this for the
"iommu_platform" property, by delaying determining which mode to use
until the guest activates the device.  Is that correct?

That might work on s390, but I don't think it will work on POWER on at
least 2 counts:

1) qemu doesn't actually have a natural way of determining if a guest
   is in secure mode (that's handled directly between the guest and
   the ultravisor).  So even at driver init time, we won't know the
   right value.

2) for virtio-pci, iommu_platform=on requires a "modern" device, not a
   legacy or transitional one.  That changes the PCI ID, which means
   we can't delay deciding it until driver init

-- 
David Gibson                    | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au  | minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
                                | _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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