Re: [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests

[Halil Pasic]

On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 10:48:42 +0200
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000
> David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > > On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> > > David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> > >   
> > > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:  
> > > > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:    
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the 
> > > > > > platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a 
> > > > > > hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's 
> > > > > > memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or 
> > > > > > POWER's PEF.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply 
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA 
> > > > > > mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared 
> > > > > > with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >  hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > >  #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > >  #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > >  #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >  
> > > > > >  GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > > > >  const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState 
> > > > > > *machine)
> > > > > >           * areas.
> > > > > >           */
> > > > > >          machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, 
> > > > > > &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +        /*
> > > > > > +         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > +         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > +         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio 
> > > > > > support
> > > > > > +         * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > +         */
> > > > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, 
> > > > > > "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, 
> > > > > > "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > >      }
> > > > > >      
> > > > > 
> > > > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well    
> > > > 
> > > > Sure.  I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > > > a follow up.  
> > > 
> > > FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> > > guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.  
> > 
> > Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
> > applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common.  The
> > disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
> > effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
> > TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.
> 
> Well, virtio-pci is available on s390, so people could try to use it --
> however, forcing disable-legacy won't hurt in that case, as it won't
> make the situation worse (I don't expect virtio-pci to work on s390
> protected guests.)

Currently we don't have to worry about virtio-pci when running in
protected mode, because PCI is not supported currently, and this is
enforced by the ultravisor which would inject operation exceptions should
a PV guest try to use our PCI instructions.

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