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Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only
From: |
Daniel P . Berrangé |
Subject: |
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels) |
Date: |
Mon, 15 Apr 2024 12:59:44 +0100 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/2.2.12 (2023-09-09) |
On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:35:13PM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 03:26:29AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 09:21:26AM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> > > If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which
> > > case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
> > >
> > > It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching
> > > and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot
> > > verification.
> > >
> > > Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but
> > > any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
> > >
> > > Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux
> > > kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
> >
> > Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
> >
> > What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag
> > to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just
> > always rely on the flag?
>
> Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching. So
> lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
>
> [ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
>
> Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux
> kernel:
>
> (1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub,
> which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you
> can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
>
> (2) Use the old EFI handover protocol. Which is the RHEL-6 era way to
> boot a linux kernel on EFI.
>
> For method (1) secure boot verification must pass. For (2) not. So if
> you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will
> first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
>
> The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact
> that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro
> keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
>
> Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some
> strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure
> boot in a way that (1) works.
>
> Options I see:
>
> (a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools
> create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
>
> (b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so
> booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
>
> (c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example
> with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi
> in some new fw_cfg file.
The problem with this is that now virt-install has to actually
find the correct a shim.efi binary. It is already somewhat hard
to find a suitable kerenl+initrd binary, and AFAIK, the places
where we get these binaries don't have shim.efi alongside.
eg for RHEL/Fedora we grab kernel+initrd from the pxeboot dir:
https://fedora.mirrorservice.org/fedora/linux/development/rawhide/Everything/x86_64/os/images/pxeboot/
This same problem with affect both options (a) and (c).
In various forums we have discussed adding the secureboot
certs to the libosinfo database, so that we can have a
customized EFI varstore with minimized certs, even for the
ISO / HDD boot scenario. If we do that, then (b) is trivial
for direct kernel boot too. (b) kills all birds with the
same stone :-)
>
> (b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options
> I see here are:
>
> (A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom.
> Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look
> that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all
> information needed ...
>
> (B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the
> guest can choose what it needs.
>
> (C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim
> switch and skip patching in case it is present.
>
> (D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
>
> Comments? Other/better ideas?
I guess (b) + (D) is probably my preference.
With regards,
Daniel
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