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Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/21] QEMU gmem implemention


From: Xiaoyao Li
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/21] QEMU gmem implemention
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 11:37:26 +0800
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 Thunderbird/102.15.1

On 9/14/2023 9:09 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 14.09.23 05:50, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
It's the v2 RFC of enabling KVM gmem[1] as the backend for private
memory.

For confidential-computing, KVM provides gmem/guest_mem interfaces for
userspace, like QEMU, to allocate user-unaccesible private memory. This
series aims to add gmem support in QEMU's RAMBlock so that each RAM can
have both hva-based shared memory and gmem_fd based private memory. QEMU
does the shared-private conversion on KVM_MEMORY_EXIT and discards the
memory.

It chooses the design that adds "private" property to hostmeory backend.
If "private" property is set, QEMU will allocate/create KVM gmem when
initialize the RAMbloch of the memory backend.

This sereis also introduces the first user of kvm gmem,
KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM. A KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM with private KVM gmem
can be created with

   $qemu -object sw-protected-vm,id=sp-vm0 \
    -object memory-backend-ram,id=mem0,size=1G,private=on \
    -machine q35,kernel_irqchip=split,confidential-guest-support=sp-vm0,memory-backend=mem0 \
    ...

Unfortunately this patch series fails the boot of OVMF at very early
stage due to triple fault, because KVM doesn't support emulating string IO
to private memory.

Is support being added? Or have we figured out what it would take to make it work?

Hi David,

I only reply the questions that werrn't covered by Sean's reply.

How does this interact with other features (memory ballooning, virtiofs, vfio/mdev/...)?

I need time to learn them before I can answer it.


This version still leave some opens to be discussed:
1. whether we need "private" propery to be user-settable?

    It seems unnecessary because vm-type is determined. If the VM is
    confidential-guest, then the RAM of the guest must be able to be
    mapped as private, i.e., have kvm gmem backend. So QEMU can
    determine the value of "private" property automatiacally based on vm
    type.

    This also aligns with the board internal MemoryRegion that needs to
    have kvm gmem backend, e.g., TDX requires OVMF to act as private
    memory so bios memory region needs to have kvm gmem fd associated.
    QEMU no doubt will do it internally automatically.

Would it make sense to have some regions without "pivate" semantics? Like NVDIMMs?

Of course it can have regions without "private" semantics.

Whether a region needs "private" backend depends on the definition of VM type. E.g., for TDX, - all the RAM needs to able to mapped as private. So it needs private gmem.
 - TDVF(OVMF) code must be mapped as private. So it needs private gmem.
- MMIO region needs to be shared for TDX 1.0, and it doesn't need private gmem;


2. hugepage support.

    KVM gmem can be allocated from hugetlbfs. How does QEMU determine
    when to allocate KVM gmem with KVM_GUEST_MEMFD_ALLOW_HUGEPAGE. The
    easiest solution is create KVM gmem with KVM_GUEST_MEMFD_ALLOW_HUGEPAGE
    only when memory backend is HostMemoryBackendFile of hugetlbfs.

Good question.

Probably "if the memory backend uses huge pages, also use huge pages for the private gmem" makes sense.

... but it becomes a mess with preallocation ... which is what people should actually be using with hugetlb. Andeventual double memory-consumption ... but maybe that's all been taken care of already?

Probably it's best to leave hugetlb support as future work and start with something minimal.


As Sean replied, I had some misunderstanding of KVM_GUEST_MEMFD_ALLOW_HUGEPAGE. If it's for THP, I think we can allow it for every gmem.

As for hugetlb, we can leave it as future work.




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