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Re: [PATCH] acpi: validate hotplug selector on access


From: Mauro Matteo Cascella
Subject: Re: [PATCH] acpi: validate hotplug selector on access
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:58:14 +0100

Hi,

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 9:52 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 09:27:51PM +0100, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 9:20 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 08:19:41PM +0100, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> > > > +Mauro & Alex
> > > >
> > > > On 12/21/21 15:48, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > When bus is looked up on a pci write, we didn't
> > > > > validate that the lookup succeeded.
> > > > > Fuzzers thus can trigger QEMU crash by dereferencing the NULL
> > > > > bus pointer.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: b32bd763a1 ("pci: introduce acpi-index property for PCI 
> > > > > device")
> > > > > Cc: "Igor Mammedov" <imammedo@redhat.com>
> > > > > Fixes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/770
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> > > >
> > > > It seems this problem is important enough to get a CVE assigned.
> > >
> > > Guest root can crash guest.
> > > I don't see why we would assign a CVE.
> >
> > Well thinking about downstream distributions, if there is a CVE assigned,
> > it helps them to have it written in the commit. Maybe I am mistaken.
> >
> > Unrelated but it seems there is a coordination problem with the
> > qemu-security@ list,
> > if this isn't a security issue, why was a CVE requested?
>
> Right.  I don't think a priveleged user crashing VM warrants a CVE,
> it can just halt a CPU or whatever. Just cancel the CVE request pls.

While I agree with you that this is kind of borderline and I expressed
similar concerns in the past, I was told that:

1) root guest users are not necessarily trustworthy (from the host perspective).
2) NULL pointer deref and similar issues caused by an
ill-handled/error condition are CVE worthy, even if triggered by root.
3) In other cases, DoS triggered by root is not a security issue
because it's an expected behavior and not an ill-handled/error
condition (think of assert failures, for example).

In other words, "ill-handled condition" is the crucial factor that
makes a bug CVE worthy or not.

+Prasad, can you shed some light on this? Is my understanding correct?

Also, please note that we regularly get CVE requests for bugs like
this and many CVEs have been assigned in the past. Of course that
doesn't mean we can't change things going forward, but I think we
should make it clear (probably here:
https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/security.html) that these
kinds of bugs are not eligible for CVE assignment.

> > > > Mauro, please update us when you get the CVE number.
> > > > Michael, please amend the CVE number before committing the fix.
> > > >
> > > > FWIW Paolo asked every fuzzed bug reproducer to be committed
> > > > as qtest, see tests/qtest/fuzz*c. Alex has a way to generate
> > > > reproducer in plain C.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > >
> > > > Phil.
> > >
>

-- 
Mauro Matteo Cascella
Red Hat Product Security
PGP-Key ID: BB3410B0




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