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[PATCH 2/4] docs: document usage of the authorization framework


From: Daniel P . Berrangé
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] docs: document usage of the authorization framework
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 18:31:08 +0100

The authorization framework provides a way to control access to network
services after a client has been authenticated. This documents how to
actually use it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 docs/system/authz.rst | 263 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 docs/system/index.rst |   1 +
 2 files changed, 264 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/system/authz.rst

diff --git a/docs/system/authz.rst b/docs/system/authz.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2276546d23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/system/authz.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+.. _client authorization:
+
+Client authorization
+--------------------
+
+When configuring a QEMU network backend with either TLS certificates or SASL
+authentication, access will be granted if the client successfully proves
+their identity. If the authorization identity database is scoped to the QEMU
+client this may be sufficient. It is common, however, for the identity database
+to be much broader and thus authentication alone does not enable sufficient
+access control. In this case QEMU provides a flexible system for enforcing
+finer grained authorization on clients post-authentication.
+
+Identity providers
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+At the time of writing there are two authentication frameworks used by QEMU
+that emit an identity upon completion.
+
+ * TLS x509 certificate distinguished name.
+
+   When configuring the QEMU backend as a network server with TLS, there
+   are a choice of credentials to use. The most common scenario is to utilize
+   x509 certificates. The simplest configuration only involves issuing
+   certificates to the servers, allowing the client to avoid a MITM attack
+   against their intended server.
+
+   It is possible, however, to enable mutual verification by requiring that
+   the client provide a certificate to the server to prove its own identity.
+   This is done by setting the property ``verify-peer=yes`` on the
+   ``tls-creds-x509`` object, which is in fact the default.
+
+   When peer verification is enabled, client will need to be issued with a
+   certificate by the same certificate authority as the server. If this is
+   still not sufficiently strong access control the Distinguished Name of
+   the certificate can be used as an identity in the QEMU authorization
+   framework.
+
+ * SASL username.
+
+   When configuring the QEMU backend as a network server with SASL, upon
+   completion of the SASL authentication mechanism, a username will be
+   provided. The format of this username will vary depending on the choice
+   of mechanism configured for SASL. It might be a simple UNIX style user
+   ``joebloggs``, while if using Kerberos/GSSAPI it can have a realm
+   attached ``joebloggs@QEMU.ORG``.  Whatever format the username is presented
+   in, it can be used with the QEMU authorization framework.
+
+Authorization drivers
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The QEMU authorization framework is a general purpose design with choice of
+user customizable drivers. These are provided as objects that can be
+created at startup using the ``-object`` argument, or at runtime using the
+``object_add`` monitor command.
+
+Simple
+^^^^^^
+
+This authorization driver provides a simple mechanism for granting access
+based on an exact match against a single identity. This is useful when it is
+known that only a single client is to be allowed access.
+
+A possible use case would be when configuring QEMU for an incoming live
+migration. It is known exactly which source QEMU the migration is expected
+to arrive from. The x509 certificate associated with this source QEMU would
+thus be used as the identity to match against. Alternatively if the virtual
+machine is dedicated to a specific tenant, then the VNC server would be
+configured with SASL and the username of only that tenant listed.
+
+To create an instance of this driver via QMP:
+
+::
+
+   {
+     "execute": "object-add",
+     "arguments": {
+       "qom-type": "authz-simple",
+       "id": "authz0",
+       "props": {
+         "identity": "fred"
+       }
+     }
+   }
+
+
+Or via the command line
+
+::
+
+   -object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred
+
+
+List
+^^^^
+
+In some network backends it will be desirable to grant access to a range of
+clients. This authorization driver provides a list mechanism for granting
+access by matching identities against a list of permitted one. Each match
+rule has an associated policy and a catch all policy applies if no rule
+matches. The match can either be done as an exact string comparison, or can
+use the shell-like glob syntax, which allows for use of wildcards.
+
+To create an instance of this class via QMP:
+
+::
+
+   {
+     "execute": "object-add",
+     "arguments": {
+       "qom-type": "authz-list",
+       "id": "authz0",
+       "props": {
+         "rules": [
+            { "match": "fred", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
+            { "match": "bob", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
+            { "match": "danb", "policy": "deny", "format": "exact" },
+            { "match": "dan*", "policy": "allow", "format": "glob" }
+         ],
+         "policy": "deny"
+       }
+     }
+   }
+
+
+Due to the way this driver requires setting nested properties, creating
+it on the command line will require use of the JSON syntax for ``-object``.
+In most cases, however, the next driver will be more suitable.
+
+List file
+^^^^^^^^^
+
+This is a variant on the previous driver that allows for a more dynamic
+access control policy by storing the match rules in a standalone file
+that can be reloaded automatically upon change.
+
+To create an instance of this class via QMP:
+
+::
+
+   {
+     "execute": "object-add",
+     "arguments": {
+       "qom-type": "authz-list-file",
+       "id": "authz0",
+       "props": {
+         "filename": "/etc/qemu/myvm-vnc.acl",
+         "refresh": true
+       }
+     }
+   }
+
+
+If ``refresh`` is ``yes``, inotify is used to monitor for changes
+to the file and auto-reload the rules.
+
+The ``myvm-vnc.acl`` file should contain the match rules in a format that
+closely matches the previous driver:
+
+::
+
+   {
+     "rules": [
+       { "match": "fred", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
+       { "match": "bob", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
+       { "match": "danb", "policy": "deny", "format": "exact" },
+       { "match": "dan*", "policy": "allow", "format": "glob" }
+     ],
+     "policy": "deny"
+   }
+
+
+The object can be created on the command line using
+
+::
+
+   -object authz-list-file,id=authz0,\
+           filename=/etc/qemu/myvm-vnc.acl,refresh=on
+
+
+PAM
+^^^
+
+In some scenarios it might be desirable to integrate with authorization
+mechanisms that are implemented outside of QEMU. In order to allow maximum
+flexibility, QEMU provides a driver that uses the ``PAM`` framework.
+
+To create an instance of this class via QMP:
+
+::
+
+   {
+     "execute": "object-add",
+     "arguments": {
+       "qom-type": "authz-pam",
+       "id": "authz0",
+       "parameters": {
+         "service": "qemu-vnc-tls"
+       }
+     }
+   }
+
+
+The driver only uses the PAM "account" verification
+subsystem. The above config would require a config
+file /etc/pam.d/qemu-vnc-tls. For a simple file
+lookup it would contain
+
+::
+
+   account requisite  pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow \
+           file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
+
+
+The external file would then contain a list of usernames.
+If x509 cert was being used as the username, a suitable
+entry would match the distinguished name:
+
+::
+
+   CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
+
+
+On the command line it can be created using
+
+::
+
+   -object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc-tls
+
+
+There are a variety of PAM plugins that can be used which are not illustrated
+here, and it is possible to implement brand new plugins using the PAM API.
+
+
+Connecting backends
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The authorization driver is created using the ``-object`` argument and then
+needs to be associated with a network service. The authorization driver object
+will be given a unique ID that needs to be referenced.
+
+The property to set in the network service will vary depending on the type of
+identity to verify. By convention, any network server backend that uses TLS
+will provide ``tls-authz`` property, while any server using SASL will provide
+a ``sasl-authz`` property.
+
+Thus a example using SASL and authorization for the VNC server would look
+like:
+
+::
+
+   $QEMU --object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred \
+         --vnc 0.0.0.0:1,sasl,sasl-authz=authz0
+
+While to validate both the x509 certificate and SASL username:
+
+::
+
+   echo "CN=laptop.qemu.org,O=QEMU Project,L=London,ST=London,C=GB" >> tls.acl
+   $QEMU --object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred \
+         --object authz-list-file,id=authz1,filename=tls.acl \
+        --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/qemu/tls,verify-peer=yes \
+         --vnc 0.0.0.0:1,sasl,sasl-authz=auth0,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz1
diff --git a/docs/system/index.rst b/docs/system/index.rst
index 6aa2f8c05c..6092eb2d91 100644
--- a/docs/system/index.rst
+++ b/docs/system/index.rst
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ Contents:
    vnc-security
    tls
    secrets
+   authz
    gdb
    managed-startup
    cpu-hotplug
-- 
2.31.1




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