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branch master updated: daemon: Address shortcoming in previous security
From: |
guix-commits |
Subject: |
branch master updated: daemon: Address shortcoming in previous security fix for CVE-2024-27297. |
Date: |
Tue, 12 Mar 2024 09:23:55 -0400 |
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
civodul pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.
The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
new ff1251de0b daemon: Address shortcoming in previous security fix for
CVE-2024-27297.
ff1251de0b is described below
commit ff1251de0bc327ec478fc66a562430fbf35aef42
Author: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
AuthorDate: Tue Mar 12 11:53:35 2024 +0100
daemon: Address shortcoming in previous security fix for CVE-2024-27297.
This is a followup to 8f4ffb3fae133bb21d7991e97c2f19a7108b1143.
Commit 8f4ffb3fae133bb21d7991e97c2f19a7108b1143 fell short in two
ways: (1) it didn’t have any effet for fixed-output derivations
performed in a chroot, which is the case for all of them except those
using “builtin:download” and “builtin:git-download”, and (2) it did not
preserve ownership when copying, leading to “suspicious ownership or
permission […] rejecting this build output” errors.
* nix/libstore/build.cc (DerivationGoal::buildDone): Account for
‘chrootRootDir’ when copying ‘drv.outputs’.
* nix/libutil/util.cc (copyFileRecursively): Add ‘fchown’ and ‘fchownat’
calls to preserve file ownership; this is necessary for chrooted
fixed-output derivation builds.
* nix/libutil/util.hh: Update comment.
Change-Id: Ib59f040e98fed59d1af81d724b874b592cbef156
---
nix/libstore/build.cc | 11 ++++++-----
nix/libutil/util.cc | 4 ++++
nix/libutil/util.hh | 7 ++++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/nix/libstore/build.cc b/nix/libstore/build.cc
index e2adee118b..d23c0944a4 100644
--- a/nix/libstore/build.cc
+++ b/nix/libstore/build.cc
@@ -1387,13 +1387,14 @@ void DerivationGoal::buildDone()
make sure that there's no stale file descriptor pointing to it
(CVE-2024-27297). */
foreach (DerivationOutputs::iterator, i, drv.outputs) {
- if (pathExists(i->second.path)) {
- Path pivot = i->second.path + ".tmp";
- copyFileRecursively(i->second.path, pivot, true);
- int err = rename(pivot.c_str(), i->second.path.c_str());
+ Path output = chrootRootDir + i->second.path;
+ if (pathExists(output)) {
+ Path pivot = output + ".tmp";
+ copyFileRecursively(output, pivot, true);
+ int err = rename(pivot.c_str(), output.c_str());
if (err != 0)
throw SysError(format("renaming `%1%' to `%2%'")
- % pivot % i->second.path);
+ % pivot % output);
}
}
}
diff --git a/nix/libutil/util.cc b/nix/libutil/util.cc
index 493f06f357..578d657293 100644
--- a/nix/libutil/util.cc
+++ b/nix/libutil/util.cc
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path
&source,
if (destinationFd == -1) throw SysError(format("opening `%1%'") %
source);
copyFile(sourceFd, destinationFd);
+ fchown(destinationFd, st.st_uid, st.st_gid);
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
char target[st.st_size + 1];
ssize_t result = readlinkat(sourceroot, source.c_str(), target,
st.st_size);
@@ -430,6 +431,8 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path
&source,
int err = symlinkat(target, destinationroot, destination.c_str());
if (err != 0)
throw SysError(format("creating symlink `%1%'") % destination);
+ fchownat(destinationroot, destination.c_str(),
+ st.st_uid, st.st_gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
} else if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
int err = mkdirat(destinationroot, destination.c_str(), 0755);
if (err != 0)
@@ -455,6 +458,7 @@ static void copyFileRecursively(int sourceroot, const Path
&source,
for (auto & i : readDirectory(sourceFd))
copyFileRecursively((int)sourceFd, i.name, (int)destinationFd,
i.name,
deleteSource);
+ fchown(destinationFd, st.st_uid, st.st_gid);
} else throw Error(format("refusing to copy irregular file `%1%'") %
source);
if (deleteSource)
diff --git a/nix/libutil/util.hh b/nix/libutil/util.hh
index 058f5f8446..377aac0684 100644
--- a/nix/libutil/util.hh
+++ b/nix/libutil/util.hh
@@ -102,9 +102,10 @@ void deletePath(const Path & path);
void deletePath(const Path & path, unsigned long long & bytesFreed,
size_t linkThreshold = 1);
-/* Copy SOURCE to DESTINATION, recursively. Throw if SOURCE contains a file
- that is not a regular file, symlink, or directory. When DELETESOURCE is
- true, delete source files once they have been copied. */
+/* Copy SOURCE to DESTINATION, recursively, preserving ownership. Throw if
+ SOURCE contains a file that is not a regular file, symlink, or directory.
+ When DELETESOURCE is true, delete source files once they have been
+ copied. */
void copyFileRecursively(const Path &source, const Path &destination,
bool deleteSource = false);
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