[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[SECURITY PATCH 010/117] commands/setpci: Restrict setpci command when l
From: |
Daniel Kiper |
Subject: |
[SECURITY PATCH 010/117] commands/setpci: Restrict setpci command when locked down |
Date: |
Tue, 2 Mar 2021 19:00:17 +0100 |
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
This command can set PCI devices register values, which makes it dangerous
in a locked down configuration. Restrict it so can't be used on this setup.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/setpci.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/setpci.c b/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
index e966af080..8a0c91f02 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/setpci.c
@@ -328,10 +328,10 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
GRUB_MOD_INIT(setpci)
{
- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("setpci", grub_cmd_setpci, 0,
- N_("[-s POSITION] [-d DEVICE] [-v VAR] "
- "REGISTER[=VALUE[:MASK]]"),
- N_("Manipulate PCI devices."), options);
+ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("setpci", grub_cmd_setpci, 0,
+ N_("[-s POSITION] [-d DEVICE] [-v VAR] "
+ "REGISTER[=VALUE[:MASK]]"),
+ N_("Manipulate PCI devices."), options);
}
GRUB_MOD_FINI(setpci)
--
2.11.0
- Re: [SECURITY PATCH 001/117] verifiers: Move verifiers API to kernel image, (continued)
- [SECURITY PATCH 002/117] efi: Move the shim_lock verifier to the GRUB core, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 004/117] kern/lockdown: Set a variable if the GRUB is locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 005/117] efi: Lockdown the GRUB when the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 003/117] kern: Add lockdown support, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 006/117] efi: Use grub_is_lockdown() instead of hardcoding a disabled modules list, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 008/117] mmap: Don't register cutmem and badram commands when lockdown is enforced, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 007/117] acpi: Don't register the acpi command when locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 009/117] commands: Restrict commands that can load BIOS or DT blobs when locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 010/117] commands/setpci: Restrict setpci command when locked down,
Daniel Kiper <=
- [SECURITY PATCH 012/117] gdb: Restrict GDB access when locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 015/117] dl: Only allow unloading modules that are not dependencies, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 013/117] loader/xnu: Don't allow loading extension and packages when locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 011/117] commands/hdparm: Restrict hdparm command when locked down, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 014/117] docs: Document the cutmem command, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 021/117] kern/efi: Fix memory leak on failure, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 019/117] net/tftp: Fix dangling memory pointer, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 018/117] net/net: Fix possible dereference to of a NULL pointer, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 024/117] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized token structure, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02
- [SECURITY PATCH 020/117] kern/parser: Fix resource leak if argc == 0, Daniel Kiper, 2021/03/02