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Re: Discuss support for the linux kernel's EFI Handover Protocol on x86


From: Michael Chang
Subject: Re: Discuss support for the linux kernel's EFI Handover Protocol on x86 and ARM
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 14:35:43 +0800
User-agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13)

On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 08:49:28PM +0100, Alexander Graf wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11.01.19 20:32, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:59 AM Alexander Graf <address@hidden> wrote:
> >> So really dumb question here: What if we didn't use the MS key? What if 
> >> instead, we just provide a SUSE/openSUSE key and give customers the 
> >> ability to sign their own grub+Linux binaries?
> > 
> > Then you end up blocking install of any Linux distribution that isn't
> > big enough to have every ARM server vendor include their keys. This is
> > the exact reason we chose not to explore this approach on x86 - we
> > didn't want Red Hat to have privileges that, say, Gentoo didn't. The
> > problem is somewhat mitigated if systems are guaranteed to be shipped
> > with Secure Boot disabled, but you then still end up encouraging
> > vendor lock-in - it becomes difficult to migrate systems from one
> > distribution to another without manual re-keying.
> 
> But on the other hand (given we gave people the right tools), wouldn't
> that also enable end users to secure things down to *their* stack?
> 
> I you are big-customer and you only want your own big-customer branded
> Linux to run on your servers, not a stock SUSE or Red Hat or whatever
> OS, then you would have the ability to easily add your key to the key store.
> 
> Isn't that a much more preferable approach? I personally would advise
> OEMs to simply not enable secure boot by default and then have everyone
> give instructions how to either
> 
>   a) install the distro key and/or
>   b) provide easy means to resign binaries themselves and install those keys
> 
> At the end of the day, as a customer I care much more about integrity of
> *my* stack, rather than whether the boot chain is MS approved, no?

I think both of you are all correct standing from different point of
view. It is then how to provide different solution to satisfy the two
ends to make it a more completed one.

My two cents.

Thanks,
Michael

> 
> 
> Alex



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