[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[GNUnet-SVN] [taler-exchange] branch master updated: inline FC reviews/r
From: |
gnunet |
Subject: |
[GNUnet-SVN] [taler-exchange] branch master updated: inline FC reviews/responses in main paper |
Date: |
Thu, 18 May 2017 15:05:35 +0200 |
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository exchange.
The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
new 57fef70 inline FC reviews/responses in main paper
57fef70 is described below
commit 57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202
Author: Christian Grothoff <address@hidden>
AuthorDate: Thu May 18 15:05:28 2017 +0200
inline FC reviews/responses in main paper
---
doc/paper/taler.tex | 13 ++++++++++++-
doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt | 2 +-
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex
index 5e8f039..ccdc544 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@
\usetikzlibrary{calc}
\usepackage{eurosym}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
-
+\usepackage{verbatim}
+\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
% Copyright
%\setcopyright{none}
@@ -1868,6 +1869,16 @@ data being persisted are represented in between
$\langle\rangle$.
\item[$\overline{C^{(i)}_p}$]{Public coin keys computed from
$\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$ by the verifier}
\end{description}
+\newpage
+\onecolumn
+\section{Supplemental: Reviews and Responses from Financial Cryptography}
+
+\subsection{FC 2016}
+\verbatiminput{taler_FC2016.txt}
+
+\subsection{FC 2017}
+\verbatiminput{taler_FC2017.txt}
+
\end{document}
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt
index de1c64a..66f8560 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt
+++ b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ be insecure.
> We added a section with proofs
I find two (possible) attacks against the refresh protocol. As the
-exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp′ , the attacker can
+exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp', the attacker can
send an arbitrary public key to the exchange that will accept, and obtain a
fresh coin. The attacker can spend partially a coin multiple times via
refreshing the coin and obtaining a fresh coin in turn, as the refresh protocol
--
To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact
address@hidden
[Prev in Thread] |
Current Thread |
[Next in Thread] |
- [GNUnet-SVN] [taler-exchange] branch master updated: inline FC reviews/responses in main paper,
gnunet <=