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Re: High Latency Offline Conversations
From: |
Daniel Golle |
Subject: |
Re: High Latency Offline Conversations |
Date: |
Sun, 5 Jul 2020 19:57:20 +0100 |
Hi Cy,
On Sun, Jul 05, 2020 at 09:44:48AM -0700, Cy wrote:
> How high-latency can a gnunet-conversation be? It seems once you do the
> initial ECDH
> handshake to get a shared secret, you could keep that secret around pretty
> much forever. I
> was thinking of a UI where conversations were like email exchanges, where you
> could
> compose it at your leisure, and reply whenever. Is that feasible?
I'm not versed enough in the cryptographic details, hence I leave that
questions for other to answer.
>
> I know in theory if we both have a shared secret, then if I publish a
> gnunet-fs://ksk
> record with that secret as the keyword, then you're the only one who can find
> it, the only
> one who can decrypt it, and we might not even have to be online at the same
> time because
> intermediate nodes can cache it. But I don't think gnunet-conversation uses
> ksk records?
> It just sends encrypted data through temporary tunnels that require low
> latency and
> simultaneous presence online, right?
I think you are confusing conversation with the (early, pre-alpha)
attempts of the secushare folks to build a (group-)chat on top of
GNUnet. conversation implements real-time (ie. RTP-like) duplex
voice-over-IP, ie. "classic" voice-calls using CADET tunnels.
>
> If so, would it be good to augment gnunet-conversation to use KSK records as
> a backup to
> synchronize unsent messages, when tunnel establishment fails? Or would it be
> better to
> have a different "private message" service entirely, that only used
> gnunet-fs? Can a
> diffie-hellman key exchange be performed over gnunet-fs without some
> crippling security
> failure?
Independently of that, I like your idea of using KSK records for
offline messaging.
We could add some reliability mechanism in the same way:
In additional to its body, the message could contain a private key
which allows the receiver to publish an ACK which only the original
sender can retrieve. Once the ACK is received by the sender, they could
stop (re-)publishing the message.
Cheers
Daniel