[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
master 007744d: Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking
|
From: |
Lars Ingebrigtsen |
|
Subject: |
master 007744d: Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking |
|
Date: |
Fri, 23 Jul 2021 07:33:42 -0400 (EDT) |
branch: master
commit 007744dd0404d6febca88b00c22981cc630fb8c0
Author: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>
Commit: Lars Ingebrigtsen <larsi@gnus.org>
Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking
* admin/merge-gnulib (GNULIB_MODULES): Add file-has-acl.
* lib/file-has-acl.c: New file, copied from Gnulib.
* lib/gnulib.mk.in, m4/gnulib-comp.m4: Regenerate.
* lib-src/emacsclient.c: Include acl.h, for file_has_acl.
(O_PATH): Default to O_SEARCH, which is good enough here.
(union local_sockaddr): New type.
(socket_status): Remove, replacing with ...
(connect_socket): New function. All callers changed.
This function checks for ownership and permissions issues with the
parent directory of the socket file, instead of checking the
owner of the socket (which does not help security).
(socknamesize): Move to file scope.
(local_sockname): New arg S. No need to pass socknamesize.
UID arg is now uid_t. All callers changed. Get file descriptor
of parent directory of socket, to foil some symlink attacks.
Do not follow symlinks to that directory.
(set_local_socket): Create the socket here instead of on
each attempt to connect it. Fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
to /tmp only if the former fails due to ENOENT. Adjust
permission-failure diagnostic to match changed behavior.
This addresses Bug#33847, which complained about emacsclient in a
safer XDG environment not connecting to an Emacs server running in
a less-safe enviroment outside XDG. The patch fixes a
longstanding issue with emacsclient permission checking.
It’s ineffective to look at the permission of the socket file
itself; on some platforms, these permissions are ignored anyway.
What matters are the permissions on the parent directory of the
socket file, as these are what make symlink attacks possible.
Change the permissions check accordingly, and also refuse to
follow symlinks to that parent directory. These changes make it
OK for emacsclient to fall back from XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the
traditionally less-safe /tmp/emacsNNNN directories, since /tmp is
universally sticky nowadays.
---
admin/merge-gnulib | 2 +-
lib-src/emacsclient.c | 226 ++++++++++++++--------
lib/file-has-acl.c | 510 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/gnulib.mk.in | 11 ++
m4/gnulib-comp.m4 | 3 +
5 files changed, 672 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
diff --git a/admin/merge-gnulib b/admin/merge-gnulib
index 1c8b442..c12e83d 100755
--- a/admin/merge-gnulib
+++ b/admin/merge-gnulib
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ GNULIB_MODULES='
crypto/md5-buffer crypto/sha1-buffer crypto/sha256-buffer
crypto/sha512-buffer
d-type diffseq double-slash-root dtoastr dtotimespec dup2
environ execinfo explicit_bzero faccessat
- fchmodat fcntl fcntl-h fdopendir
+ fchmodat fcntl fcntl-h fdopendir file-has-acl
filemode filename filevercmp flexmember fpieee
free-posix fstatat fsusage fsync futimens
getloadavg getopt-gnu getrandom gettime gettimeofday gitlog-to-changelog
diff --git a/lib-src/emacsclient.c b/lib-src/emacsclient.c
index 12ced4a..8346524 100644
--- a/lib-src/emacsclient.c
+++ b/lib-src/emacsclient.c
@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@ char *w32_getenv (const char *);
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#ifndef WINDOWSNT
+# include <acl.h>
+#endif
#include <filename.h>
#include <intprops.h>
#include <min-max.h>
@@ -91,6 +94,10 @@ char *w32_getenv (const char *);
# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-truncation=2"
#endif
+#if !defined O_PATH && !defined WINDOWSNT
+# define O_PATH O_SEARCH
+#endif
+
/* Name used to invoke this program. */
static char const *progname;
@@ -1128,24 +1135,74 @@ process_grouping (void)
#ifdef SOCKETS_IN_FILE_SYSTEM
-/* Return the file status of NAME, ordinarily a socket.
- It should be owned by UID. Return one of the following:
- >0 - 'stat' failed with this errno value
- -1 - isn't owned by us
- 0 - success: none of the above */
+/* A local socket address. The union avoids the need to cast. */
+union local_sockaddr
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un un;
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+};
+
+/* Relative to the directory DIRFD, connect the socket file named ADDR
+ to the socket S. Return 0 if successful, -1 if DIRFD is not
+ AT_FDCWD and DIRFD's permissions would allow a symlink attack, an
+ errno otherwise. */
static int
-socket_status (const char *name, uid_t uid)
+connect_socket (int dirfd, char const *addr, int s, uid_t uid)
{
- struct stat statbfr;
+ int sock_status = 0;
- if (stat (name, &statbfr) != 0)
- return errno;
+ union local_sockaddr server;
+ if (sizeof server.un.sun_path <= strlen (addr))
+ return ENAMETOOLONG;
+ server.un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strcpy (server.un.sun_path, addr);
- if (statbfr.st_uid != uid)
- return -1;
+ /* If -1, WDFD is not set yet. If nonnegative, WDFD is a file
+ descriptor for the initial working directory. Otherwise -1 - WDFD is
+ the error number for the initial working directory. */
+ static int wdfd = -1;
- return 0;
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD)
+ {
+ /* Fail if DIRFD's permissions are bogus. */
+ struct stat st;
+ if (fstat (dirfd, &st) != 0)
+ return errno;
+ if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (wdfd == -1)
+ {
+ /* Save the initial working directory. */
+ wdfd = open (".", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (wdfd < 0)
+ wdfd = -1 - errno;
+ }
+ if (wdfd < 0)
+ return -1 - wdfd;
+ if (fchdir (dirfd) != 0)
+ return errno;
+
+ /* Fail if DIRFD has an ACL, which means its permissions are
+ almost surely bogus. */
+ int has_acl = file_has_acl (".", &st);
+ if (has_acl)
+ sock_status = has_acl < 0 ? errno : -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!sock_status)
+ sock_status = connect (s, &server.sa, sizeof server.un) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
+
+ /* Fail immediately if we cannot change back to the initial working
+ directory, as that can mess up the rest of execution. */
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD && fchdir (wdfd) != 0)
+ {
+ message (true, "%s: .: %s\n", progname, strerror (errno));
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ return sock_status;
}
@@ -1322,32 +1379,49 @@ act_on_signals (HSOCKET emacs_socket)
}
}
-/* Create in SOCKNAME (of size SOCKNAMESIZE) a name for a local socket.
- The first TMPDIRLEN bytes of SOCKNAME are already initialized to be
- the name of a temporary directory. Use UID and SERVER_NAME to
- concoct the name. Return the total length of the name if successful,
- -1 if it does not fit (and store a truncated name in that case).
- Fail if TMPDIRLEN is out of range. */
+enum { socknamesize = sizeof ((struct sockaddr_un *) NULL)->sun_path };
+
+/* Given a local socket S, create in *SOCKNAME a name for a local socket
+ and connect to that socket. The first TMPDIRLEN bytes of *SOCKNAME are
+ already initialized to be the name of a temporary directory.
+ Use UID and SERVER_NAME to concoct the name. Return 0 if
+ successful, -1 if the socket's parent directory is not safe, and an
+ errno if there is some other problem. */
static int
-local_sockname (char *sockname, int socknamesize, int tmpdirlen,
- uintmax_t uid, char const *server_name)
+local_sockname (int s, char sockname[socknamesize], int tmpdirlen,
+ uid_t uid, char const *server_name)
{
/* If ! (0 <= TMPDIRLEN && TMPDIRLEN < SOCKNAMESIZE) the truncated
temporary directory name is already in SOCKNAME, so nothing more
need be stored. */
- if (0 <= tmpdirlen)
- {
- int remaining = socknamesize - tmpdirlen;
- if (0 < remaining)
- {
- int suffixlen = snprintf (&sockname[tmpdirlen], remaining,
- "/emacs%"PRIuMAX"/%s", uid, server_name);
- if (0 <= suffixlen && suffixlen < remaining)
- return tmpdirlen + suffixlen;
- }
- }
- return -1;
+ if (! (0 <= tmpdirlen && tmpdirlen < socknamesize))
+ return ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ /* Put the full address name into the buffer, since the caller might
+ need it for diagnostics. But don't overrun the buffer. */
+ uintmax_t uidmax = uid;
+ int emacsdirlen;
+ int suffixlen = snprintf (sockname + tmpdirlen, socknamesize - tmpdirlen,
+ "/emacs%"PRIuMAX"%n/%s", uidmax, &emacsdirlen,
+ server_name);
+ if (! (0 <= suffixlen && suffixlen < socknamesize - tmpdirlen))
+ return ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ /* Make sure the address's parent directory is not a symlink and is
+ this user's directory and does not let others write to it; this
+ fends off some symlink attacks. To avoid races, keep the parent
+ directory open while checking. */
+ char *emacsdirend = sockname + tmpdirlen + emacsdirlen;
+ *emacsdirend = '\0';
+ int dir = openat (AT_FDCWD, sockname,
+ O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+ *emacsdirend = '/';
+ if (dir < 0)
+ return errno;
+ int sock_status = connect_socket (dir, server_name, s, uid);
+ close (dir);
+ return sock_status;
}
/* Create a local socket for SERVER_NAME and connect it to Emacs. If
@@ -1358,28 +1432,43 @@ local_sockname (char *sockname, int socknamesize, int
tmpdirlen,
static HSOCKET
set_local_socket (char const *server_name)
{
- union {
- struct sockaddr_un un;
- struct sockaddr sa;
- } server = {{ .sun_family = AF_UNIX }};
+ union local_sockaddr server;
+ int sock_status;
char *sockname = server.un.sun_path;
- enum { socknamesize = sizeof server.un.sun_path };
int tmpdirlen = -1;
int socknamelen = -1;
uid_t uid = geteuid ();
bool tmpdir_used = false;
+ int s = cloexec_socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0)
+ {
+ message (true, "%s: can't create socket: %s\n",
+ progname, strerror (errno));
+ fail ();
+ }
if (strchr (server_name, '/')
|| (ISSLASH ('\\') && strchr (server_name, '\\')))
- socknamelen = snprintf (sockname, socknamesize, "%s", server_name);
+ {
+ socknamelen = snprintf (sockname, socknamesize, "%s", server_name);
+ sock_status = (0 <= socknamelen && socknamelen < socknamesize
+ ? connect_socket (AT_FDCWD, sockname, s, 0)
+ : ENAMETOOLONG);
+ }
else
{
/* socket_name is a file name component. */
+ sock_status = ENOENT;
char const *xdg_runtime_dir = egetenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR");
if (xdg_runtime_dir)
- socknamelen = snprintf (sockname, socknamesize, "%s/emacs/%s",
- xdg_runtime_dir, server_name);
- else
+ {
+ socknamelen = snprintf (sockname, socknamesize, "%s/emacs/%s",
+ xdg_runtime_dir, server_name);
+ sock_status = (0 <= socknamelen && socknamelen < socknamesize
+ ? connect_socket (AT_FDCWD, sockname, s, 0)
+ : ENAMETOOLONG);
+ }
+ if (sock_status == ENOENT)
{
char const *tmpdir = egetenv ("TMPDIR");
if (tmpdir)
@@ -1398,23 +1487,24 @@ set_local_socket (char const *server_name)
if (tmpdirlen < 0)
tmpdirlen = snprintf (sockname, socknamesize, "/tmp");
}
- socknamelen = local_sockname (sockname, socknamesize, tmpdirlen,
+ sock_status = local_sockname (s, sockname, tmpdirlen,
uid, server_name);
tmpdir_used = true;
}
}
- if (! (0 <= socknamelen && socknamelen < socknamesize))
+ if (sock_status == 0)
+ return s;
+
+ if (sock_status == ENAMETOOLONG)
{
message (true, "%s: socket-name %s... too long\n", progname, sockname);
fail ();
}
- /* See if the socket exists, and if it's owned by us. */
- int sock_status = socket_status (sockname, uid);
- if (sock_status)
+ if (tmpdir_used)
{
- /* Failing that, see if LOGNAME or USER exist and differ from
+ /* See whether LOGNAME or USER exist and differ from
our euid. If so, look for a socket based on the UID
associated with the name. This is reminiscent of the logic
that init_editfns uses to set the global Vuser_full_name. */
@@ -1431,48 +1521,26 @@ set_local_socket (char const *server_name)
if (pw && pw->pw_uid != uid)
{
/* We're running under su, apparently. */
- socknamelen = local_sockname (sockname, socknamesize, tmpdirlen,
+ sock_status = local_sockname (s, sockname, tmpdirlen,
pw->pw_uid, server_name);
- if (socknamelen < 0)
+ if (sock_status == 0)
+ return s;
+ if (sock_status == ENAMETOOLONG)
{
message (true, "%s: socket-name %s... too long\n",
progname, sockname);
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
-
- sock_status = socket_status (sockname, uid);
}
}
}
- if (sock_status == 0)
- {
- HSOCKET s = cloexec_socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (s < 0)
- {
- message (true, "%s: socket: %s\n", progname, strerror (errno));
- return INVALID_SOCKET;
- }
- if (connect (s, &server.sa, sizeof server.un) != 0)
- {
- message (true, "%s: connect: %s\n", progname, strerror (errno));
- CLOSE_SOCKET (s);
- return INVALID_SOCKET;
- }
+ close (s);
- struct stat connect_stat;
- if (fstat (s, &connect_stat) != 0)
- sock_status = errno;
- else if (connect_stat.st_uid == uid)
- return s;
- else
- sock_status = -1;
-
- CLOSE_SOCKET (s);
- }
-
- if (sock_status < 0)
- message (true, "%s: Invalid socket owner\n", progname);
+ if (sock_status == -1)
+ message (true,
+ "%s: Invalid permissions on parent directory of socket: %s\n",
+ progname, sockname);
else if (sock_status == ENOENT)
{
if (tmpdir_used)
@@ -1502,7 +1570,7 @@ set_local_socket (char const *server_name)
}
}
else
- message (true, "%s: can't stat %s: %s\n",
+ message (true, "%s: can't connect to %s: %s\n",
progname, sockname, strerror (sock_status));
return INVALID_SOCKET;
diff --git a/lib/file-has-acl.c b/lib/file-has-acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c667ae9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/file-has-acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+/* Test whether a file has a nontrivial ACL. -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+ Copyright (C) 2002-2003, 2005-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+ This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+ Written by Paul Eggert, Andreas Grünbacher, and Bruno Haible. */
+
+/* Without this pragma, gcc 4.7.0 20120126 may suggest that the
+ file_has_acl function might be candidate for attribute 'const' */
+#if (__GNUC__ == 4 && 6 <= __GNUC_MINOR__) || 4 < __GNUC__
+# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsuggest-attribute=const"
+#endif
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include "acl.h"
+
+#include "acl-internal.h"
+
+#if GETXATTR_WITH_POSIX_ACLS
+# include <sys/xattr.h>
+# include <linux/xattr.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Return 1 if NAME has a nontrivial access control list,
+ 0 if ACLs are not supported, or if NAME has no or only a base ACL,
+ and -1 (setting errno) on error. Note callers can determine
+ if ACLs are not supported as errno is set in that case also.
+ SB must be set to the stat buffer of NAME,
+ obtained through stat() or lstat(). */
+
+int
+file_has_acl (char const *name, struct stat const *sb)
+{
+#if USE_ACL
+ if (! S_ISLNK (sb->st_mode))
+ {
+
+# if GETXATTR_WITH_POSIX_ACLS
+
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = getxattr (name, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, NULL, 0);
+ if (ret < 0 && errno == ENODATA)
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (ret == 0 && S_ISDIR (sb->st_mode))
+ {
+ ret = getxattr (name, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, NULL, 0);
+ if (ret < 0 && errno == ENODATA)
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return - acl_errno_valid (errno);
+ return ret;
+
+# elif HAVE_ACL_GET_FILE
+
+ /* POSIX 1003.1e (draft 17 -- abandoned) specific version. */
+ /* Linux, FreeBSD, Mac OS X, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
+ int ret;
+
+ if (HAVE_ACL_EXTENDED_FILE) /* Linux */
+ {
+ /* On Linux, acl_extended_file is an optimized function: It only
+ makes two calls to getxattr(), one for ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, one for
+ ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT. */
+ ret = acl_extended_file (name);
+ }
+ else /* FreeBSD, Mac OS X, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
+ {
+# if HAVE_ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED /* Mac OS X */
+ /* On Mac OS X, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ and acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
+ always return NULL / EINVAL. There is no point in making
+ these two useless calls. The real ACL is retrieved through
+ acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED). */
+ acl_t acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED);
+ if (acl)
+ {
+ ret = acl_extended_nontrivial (acl);
+ acl_free (acl);
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -1;
+# else /* FreeBSD, IRIX, Tru64, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
+ acl_t acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
+ if (acl)
+ {
+ int saved_errno;
+
+ ret = acl_access_nontrivial (acl);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ acl_free (acl);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+# if HAVE_ACL_FREE_TEXT /* Tru64 */
+ /* On OSF/1, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) always
+ returns NULL with errno not set. There is no point in
+ making this call. */
+# else /* FreeBSD, IRIX, Cygwin >= 2.5 */
+ /* On Linux, FreeBSD, IRIX, acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ and acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) on a directory
+ either both succeed or both fail; it depends on the
+ file system. Therefore there is no point in making the second
+ call if the first one already failed. */
+ if (ret == 0 && S_ISDIR (sb->st_mode))
+ {
+ acl = acl_get_file (name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
+ if (acl)
+ {
+# ifdef __CYGWIN__ /* Cygwin >= 2.5 */
+ ret = acl_access_nontrivial (acl);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ acl_free (acl);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+# else
+ ret = (0 < acl_entries (acl));
+ acl_free (acl);
+# endif
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+# endif
+ }
+ else
+ ret = -1;
+# endif
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return - acl_errno_valid (errno);
+ return ret;
+
+# elif HAVE_FACL && defined GETACL /* Solaris, Cygwin < 2.5, not HP-UX */
+
+# if defined ACL_NO_TRIVIAL
+
+ /* Solaris 10 (newer version), which has additional API declared in
+ <sys/acl.h> (acl_t) and implemented in libsec (acl_set, acl_trivial,
+ acl_fromtext, ...). */
+ return acl_trivial (name);
+
+# else /* Solaris, Cygwin, general case */
+
+ /* Solaris 2.5 through Solaris 10, Cygwin, and contemporaneous versions
+ of Unixware. The acl() call returns the access and default ACL both
+ at once. */
+ {
+ /* Initially, try to read the entries into a stack-allocated buffer.
+ Use malloc if it does not fit. */
+ enum
+ {
+ alloc_init = 4000 / sizeof (aclent_t), /* >= 3 */
+ alloc_max = MIN (INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof (aclent_t))
+ };
+ aclent_t buf[alloc_init];
+ size_t alloc = alloc_init;
+ aclent_t *entries = buf;
+ aclent_t *malloced = NULL;
+ int count;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ count = acl (name, GETACL, alloc, entries);
+ if (count < 0 && errno == ENOSPC)
+ {
+ /* Increase the size of the buffer. */
+ free (malloced);
+ if (alloc > alloc_max / 2)
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ alloc = 2 * alloc; /* <= alloc_max */
+ entries = malloced =
+ (aclent_t *) malloc (alloc * sizeof (aclent_t));
+ if (entries == NULL)
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (count < 0)
+ {
+ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == ENOTSUP)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ free (malloced);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (count == 0)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ /* Don't use MIN_ACL_ENTRIES: It's set to 4 on Cygwin, but Cygwin
+ returns only 3 entries for files with no ACL. But this is safe:
+ If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
+ "user::", "group::", "other:", and "mask:" entries. */
+ if (count > 4)
+ {
+ free (malloced);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (acl_nontrivial (count, entries))
+ {
+ free (malloced);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ free (malloced);
+ }
+
+# ifdef ACE_GETACL
+ /* Solaris also has a different variant of ACLs, used in ZFS and NFSv4
+ file systems (whereas the other ones are used in UFS file systems).
*/
+ {
+ /* Initially, try to read the entries into a stack-allocated buffer.
+ Use malloc if it does not fit. */
+ enum
+ {
+ alloc_init = 4000 / sizeof (ace_t), /* >= 3 */
+ alloc_max = MIN (INT_MAX, SIZE_MAX / sizeof (ace_t))
+ };
+ ace_t buf[alloc_init];
+ size_t alloc = alloc_init;
+ ace_t *entries = buf;
+ ace_t *malloced = NULL;
+ int count;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ count = acl (name, ACE_GETACL, alloc, entries);
+ if (count < 0 && errno == ENOSPC)
+ {
+ /* Increase the size of the buffer. */
+ free (malloced);
+ if (alloc > alloc_max / 2)
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ alloc = 2 * alloc; /* <= alloc_max */
+ entries = malloced = (ace_t *) malloc (alloc * sizeof (ace_t));
+ if (entries == NULL)
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (count < 0)
+ {
+ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EINVAL)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ free (malloced);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (count == 0)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ /* In the old (original Solaris 10) convention:
+ If there are more than 3 entries, there cannot be only the
+ ACE_OWNER, ACE_GROUP, ACE_OTHER entries.
+ In the newer Solaris 10 and Solaris 11 convention:
+ If there are more than 6 entries, there cannot be only the
+ ACE_OWNER, ACE_GROUP, ACE_EVERYONE entries, each once with
+ NEW_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE and once with
+ NEW_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE. */
+ if (count > 6)
+ {
+ free (malloced);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (acl_ace_nontrivial (count, entries))
+ {
+ free (malloced);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ free (malloced);
+ }
+# endif
+
+ return 0;
+# endif
+
+# elif HAVE_GETACL /* HP-UX */
+
+ {
+ struct acl_entry entries[NACLENTRIES];
+ int count;
+
+ count = getacl (name, NACLENTRIES, entries);
+
+ if (count < 0)
+ {
+ /* ENOSYS is seen on newer HP-UX versions.
+ EOPNOTSUPP is typically seen on NFS mounts.
+ ENOTSUP was seen on Quantum StorNext file systems (cvfs). */
+ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOTSUP)
+ ;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if (count == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else /* count > 0 */
+ {
+ if (count > NACLENTRIES)
+ /* If NACLENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
+ allocation. */
+ abort ();
+
+ /* If there are more than 3 entries, there cannot be only the
+ (uid,%), (%,gid), (%,%) entries. */
+ if (count > 3)
+ return 1;
+
+ {
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ if (stat (name, &statbuf) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return acl_nontrivial (count, entries);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+# if HAVE_ACLV_H /* HP-UX >= 11.11 */
+
+ {
+ struct acl entries[NACLVENTRIES];
+ int count;
+
+ count = acl ((char *) name, ACL_GET, NACLVENTRIES, entries);
+
+ if (count < 0)
+ {
+ /* EOPNOTSUPP is seen on NFS in HP-UX 11.11, 11.23.
+ EINVAL is seen on NFS in HP-UX 11.31. */
+ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == EINVAL)
+ ;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if (count == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else /* count > 0 */
+ {
+ if (count > NACLVENTRIES)
+ /* If NACLVENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
+ allocation. */
+ abort ();
+
+ /* If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
+ four base ACL entries. */
+ if (count > 4)
+ return 1;
+
+ return aclv_nontrivial (count, entries);
+ }
+ }
+
+# endif
+
+# elif HAVE_ACLX_GET && defined ACL_AIX_WIP /* AIX */
+
+ acl_type_t type;
+ char aclbuf[1024];
+ void *acl = aclbuf;
+ size_t aclsize = sizeof (aclbuf);
+ mode_t mode;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ /* The docs say that type being 0 is equivalent to ACL_ANY, but it
+ is not true, in AIX 5.3. */
+ type.u64 = ACL_ANY;
+ if (aclx_get (name, 0, &type, aclbuf, &aclsize, &mode) >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (errno == ENOSYS)
+ return 0;
+ if (errno != ENOSPC)
+ {
+ if (acl != aclbuf)
+ {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ free (acl);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ aclsize = 2 * aclsize;
+ if (acl != aclbuf)
+ free (acl);
+ acl = malloc (aclsize);
+ if (acl == NULL)
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (type.u64 == ACL_AIXC)
+ {
+ int result = acl_nontrivial ((struct acl *) acl);
+ if (acl != aclbuf)
+ free (acl);
+ return result;
+ }
+ else if (type.u64 == ACL_NFS4)
+ {
+ int result = acl_nfs4_nontrivial ((nfs4_acl_int_t *) acl);
+ if (acl != aclbuf)
+ free (acl);
+ return result;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* A newer type of ACL has been introduced in the system.
+ We should better support it. */
+ if (acl != aclbuf)
+ free (acl);
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+# elif HAVE_STATACL /* older AIX */
+
+ union { struct acl a; char room[4096]; } u;
+
+ if (statacl ((char *) name, STX_NORMAL, &u.a, sizeof (u)) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return acl_nontrivial (&u.a);
+
+# elif HAVE_ACLSORT /* NonStop Kernel */
+
+ {
+ struct acl entries[NACLENTRIES];
+ int count;
+
+ count = acl ((char *) name, ACL_GET, NACLENTRIES, entries);
+
+ if (count < 0)
+ {
+ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == ENOTSUP)
+ ;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if (count == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else /* count > 0 */
+ {
+ if (count > NACLENTRIES)
+ /* If NACLENTRIES cannot be trusted, use dynamic memory
+ allocation. */
+ abort ();
+
+ /* If there are more than 4 entries, there cannot be only the
+ four base ACL entries. */
+ if (count > 4)
+ return 1;
+
+ return acl_nontrivial (count, entries);
+ }
+ }
+
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/gnulib.mk.in b/lib/gnulib.mk.in
index 07736f9..0b9aaf6 100644
--- a/lib/gnulib.mk.in
+++ b/lib/gnulib.mk.in
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
# fcntl \
# fcntl-h \
# fdopendir \
+# file-has-acl \
# filemode \
# filename \
# filevercmp \
@@ -1788,6 +1789,16 @@ EXTRA_libgnu_a_SOURCES += fdopendir.c
endif
## end gnulib module fdopendir
+## begin gnulib module file-has-acl
+ifeq (,$(OMIT_GNULIB_MODULE_file-has-acl))
+
+libgnu_a_SOURCES += file-has-acl.c
+
+EXTRA_DIST += acl-internal.h
+
+endif
+## end gnulib module file-has-acl
+
## begin gnulib module filemode
ifeq (,$(OMIT_GNULIB_MODULE_filemode))
diff --git a/m4/gnulib-comp.m4 b/m4/gnulib-comp.m4
index cd6f7b4..05e7faa 100644
--- a/m4/gnulib-comp.m4
+++ b/m4/gnulib-comp.m4
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([gl_EARLY],
# Code from module fcntl:
# Code from module fcntl-h:
# Code from module fdopendir:
+ # Code from module file-has-acl:
# Code from module filemode:
# Code from module filename:
# Code from module filevercmp:
@@ -287,6 +288,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([gl_INIT],
fi
gl_DIRENT_MODULE_INDICATOR([fdopendir])
gl_MODULE_INDICATOR([fdopendir])
+ gl_FILE_HAS_ACL
gl_FILEMODE
AC_C_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER
gl_FUNC_FPENDING
@@ -1045,6 +1047,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([gl_FILE_LIST], [
lib/fcntl.c
lib/fcntl.in.h
lib/fdopendir.c
+ lib/file-has-acl.c
lib/filemode.c
lib/filemode.h
lib/filename.h
| [Prev in Thread] |
Current Thread |
[Next in Thread] |
- master 007744d: Redo emacsclient socket symlink-attack checking,
Lars Ingebrigtsen <=