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Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el
From: |
Ted Zlatanov |
Subject: |
Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el |
Date: |
Mon, 02 May 2011 14:21:32 -0500 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.110018 (No Gnus v0.18) Emacs/24.0.50 (gnu/linux) |
On Mon, 02 May 2011 20:59:18 +0200 Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <address@hidden>
wrote:
LMI> Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
LMI> "--x509keyfile" "--x509certfile"
>>
LMI> to gnutlc-cli. `open-network-stream' has no concept of these things,
LMI> and I'm not sure gnutls.c has, either. Ted?
>>
>> Yes, definitely, with the :keyfiles and :trustfiles parameters to
>> `gnutls-boot'.
LMI> Right. Would "--x509keyfile" correspond to :keyfiles and
LMI> "--x509certfile" to :trustfiles?
Oh wait, I think I'm wrong. The key+cert files (client-side SSL certs)
are not the same as the trust files (which verify the server's SSL
cert). Let me take a look, this may require another parameter or I'm
missing something.
>> This is all nasty, nasty for the user. The whole
>> `smtpmail-starttls-credentials' structure can be replaced with
>> `auth-source-search' calls for all possible use cases. The user can
>> say, for instance:
>>
>> machine mysmtpserver.com login tzz password mypassword keyfile "~/.keyfile"
LMI> Yes, that makes a whole lot more sense. Hm... but on what level would
LMI> this be checked? `open-network-stream' could do that, but if the auth
LMI> file is a .gpg file, it'll have to ask for a password just to check
LMI> whether there is a keyfile, which, in 99.99% of the cases there won't
LMI> be.
There's no problem with specifying an unencrypted authinfo file for a
specific server+port+user (or any subset) combination, see
`auth-sources'. So the authinfo line would look like this:
machine mysmtpserver.com login tzz password mypassword keyfile "~/.keyfile"
certfile "~/.certfile"
LMI> Uhm. How did that discussion about non-secret credentials go? :-)
Look! It's Elvis! (runs away)
Ted
- Re: Emacs RPC security, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Re: Emacs RPC security, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el (was: Emacs RPC security), Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, James Cloos, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el,
Ted Zlatanov <=
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/03
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/03
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/05/30