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bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull"
From: |
Christopher Allan Webber |
Subject: |
bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" |
Date: |
Wed, 02 Mar 2016 13:07:04 -0800 |
User-agent: |
mu4e 0.9.13; emacs 24.5.1 |
Leo Famulari writes:
> On Wed, Mar 02, 2016 at 10:03:59AM -0800, Christopher Allan Webber wrote:
>> Right now, when a user does a "guix pull", that pulls down the latest
>> repository of code from git, which is kept in a tarball. Once you
>> receive the latest code, this has some checks: what's the hash of each
>> package, etc.
>
> A discussion worth having. But, let's merge this bug into
> debbugs.gnu.org/22629.
I'm not sure they should be merged, though they're related. That thread
doesn't deal at all with security, though it provides some other good
ideas. It even says:
PS: I do not mention the issue of authenticating code here, which is
obviously very important and deserves to be treated separately.
However I have no objections to merging them if others think we should
> Also, we should read "The Update Framework" as requested there.
This? https://theupdateframework.github.io/
There seem to be quite a few papers there!