bug#61277: FR: ELPA security - Restrict package builds to signed git commits

[Richard Stallman]

Please forgive my delay in replying.

  > If an attacker can introduce a commit containing malicious code, and
  > create a new git tag pointing to that commit, the GNU ELPA scripts will
  > fetch it, and release a new version of the package (now including the
  > malicious code).  By requiring tags to be cryptographically signed, we
  > can have a greater confidence that any new tag has at the very least
  > been signed off by the developer him/herself.

This seems wise to me.  Does anyone have arguments against?

-- 
Dr Richard Stallman (https://stallman.org)
Chief GNUisance of the GNU Project (https://gnu.org)
Founder, Free Software Foundation (https://fsf.org)
Internet Hall-of-Famer (https://internethalloffame.org)